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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case

No. 16132

JOHNNIE MICHAEL CHAVEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEJlll..ENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged by information with the crimes
of manslaughter in violation of Utah Code Ann.,

§

76-5-205(1)

(a) , ( 19 7 3, as amended) , and Auto.mobile Homicide in violation
of§ 76-5-207 Utah Code Ann., (1973, as amended).

Both

charges were filed as a result of an automobile accident
in which appellant was involved on July 21, 1977.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The matter was tried before the Honorable Ernest
F. Baldwin, Jr., sitting with a jury, on March 27, 28, and
29, 1978.

The case was sent to the jury on the charge of
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Au:tomobile Homicide and appellant was found guilty of that
offense.

Thereafter, appellant was committed to the Utah

State Prison for the term provided by law, zero to five
years.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmation of the judgment
of the lower court as well as the sentence imposed.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On July 21, 1977, at approximately 10:45 p.m.
at 3900 South State Street in Salt Lake City, appellant was
involved in an automobile accident with another automobile
driven by Gennar Skollingsberg (T. 39, 42, 179, 180).

In

the Skollingsberg vehicle was 26-month old Eric who died
as a result of head injuries sufferec. in the accident (T. 43).
At trial, Mr. Skollingsberg testified that he
was southbound on State Street, stopped for a red light in
the left turn lane, then turned left, or east, onto 3900
South when his car was hit by an automobile coming north
on State Street (T. 38-42).

The automobile that collided

with Mr. Skollingsberg's was driven by the appellant,
Mr. Skollingsberg also

strt~

Johnnie Chavez

(T. 179, 180).

that he began

to proceed turning left into the intersection

once the green arrow in his lane of traffic came on (T.
He further testified that he noticed the through traffic
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4s- 4 ~I·

lights were red as the green arrow in his lane came on
(T. 48-49) ·

Cars headed north on State Street in through

traffic lanes were stopped at the intersection, with the
exception of those cars turni.ng left into the intersection
west on 3900 South (T. 53).
Thelma Skollingsberg, Gennar's sister, was a
passenger in the Skollingsberg car, and corroborated his
testimony

(T. 56-59; 60-63).

In addition, she stated

that as her brother began to turn into the intersection onto
3900 South, she looked down State Street and saw a car
(which turned out to be the one appellant was driving),
"coming real quick"

(T. 57).

Richard Williams, a professional over-the-road
truck driver, testified that he was stopped in the traffic
lanes

(through lanes), headed north on State Street at 3900

South, waiting for the red light to change.

He heard the

sound of a car approaching from his right rear (the high
revolutions of the motor turning (T. 67)),
used for through traffic (T. 66-67).

in a lane not

This approaching

car was driven by appellant and was estimated

by Mr.

Williams to be traveling at the rate of approximately
65 miles per hour (T. 71).

He also stated that he observed

the car driven by appellant strike the Skollingsberg vehicle
and bounce off (T. 67, 71).

The light controlling the

-3-
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traffic headed north on State Street, the direction in
which appellant's car was heading, was
accident occurred (T . 73) .

red when the

I mrne d'ia t e 1 y a f ter t h e collision,

the light controlling :northbound through traffic on State
Street turned green and traffic began to move (T. 76-79).
Wayne Spens corroborated the testimony of Richard
Williams, stating that as he sat stopped in his jeep at
the intersection of State Street and 3900 South (he was
headed iiiorth on State), his attention was drawn ito a high.
loud. engine noise off to his right-hand side (T. 80-82).
Spens was in the far right-hand lane (T. 81), and as he heard
the noise of the engine from appellant's approaching car,
he (Spens) turned his head just in time to see "a blur of
a car" go by on his right

(T. 821.

of appellant's car to be about

He estimated the speed

60 miles per hour as it

entered the intersection and collided with the Skollingsberg
vehicle (T. 83).

Mr. Spens further stated that the color

of the traffic light for through traffic heading '!no~th was
red at the time appellant's vehicle entered the intersection
(T. 83-84).
Other passengers in Wayne Spen' s ieeP corroborated
the fact that the liqht for :northbound traffic at 3900 south
_:_and Stc.te Street was red (T. 91, 82, 89), that thev heard a

-4-
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loud engine noise (T. 91), and that appellant was driving
his car in a cement gutter portion of the road used only
for right turns and as a bus stop (T. 66, 95), not for
through traffic.

Suzanna Pons also stated that she saw

appellant exit the car from the driver's side following the
crash, and noticed the appellant "wander around," acting
like he was in a daze (T. 98,99).
Two witnesses to the accident, John Oldroyd and Don
Askee, testified that they were sittinq on a bench very close
to the corner of 3900 South and State when appellant's
vehicle ran the red light and hit the Skollingsberg vehicle
(T. 109, 117).

Both boys also stated that appellant's car

went through the intersection in the far right-hand lane
next to the gutter (T. 109, 116), before colliding with the
other vehicle.

They also stated that appellant's car was

so close to the bench where they were sitting they had to
pull their feet and legs up to keep from getting hit (T. 109,
117)

[the car was less than two feet from them (T. 109, 117) J •
The arresting officers stated that the appellant

was arrested as he was walking briskly and fast away from
the scene of the accident (T. 122, 130).

Appellant seemed

to be uoset (T. 130), and both Officers Smith and Rigby
detected the odor of alcoholic beveraqe about appellant's
person (T. 123, 128).
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Appellant was administered first aid for his
iniuries at the scene of the accident, then taken to a
hospital (T. 127, 133).

Followinq his arrival at the

hospital, samples of blood were taken from appellant at
12:14 a.m. and 12:45 a.m. on July 22, 1977

(T. 190-191).

While in the hospital, acpellant asked his friend Eppie
Duran, a passenger in appellant's car, what color the
(traffic) light was (T. 140).

The nurse who drew the blood

samples from appellant, Evelyn Mayberry. testified that she
detected the odor of alcohol on appellant's breath and that
his pupils were dilated (T. 191).
Lynn Davis, a chemist with the City /County Health
Department of Salt Lake County, testifed that he received
the blood samples from Ms. Mayberry on July 22, 1977, and
that on August 1, 1977, he analyzed them for the alcohol
content level. usinq the "enzyme method"
His results showed

(T. 208, 212, 213).

.19 percent ethyl alcohol by weight in

both samples extracted from appellant (T. 214).
Dr. Bryan Finkle, a pharmacologist, pathologist
and toxicologisttestified that in general, an individual
will reach their maximum blood alcohol concentration level
about one hour after their last drink (T. 251}.

He also

stated that alcohol is cleared from the blood following
.
.
. king occurs,
maximum
concentration,
provi. d.ing no f urt h er d rin
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at about 0.02% per hour (T. 252).

Using two given situations,

(absorption and alcohol clearance), Dr. Finkle testified
that in one situation (alcohol elimination), if there was no
drinking for a long period of time prior to the .19 alcohol
level reading (at 12:15 a.m. on July 22, 1977), and using the
fact that alcohol clears the blood at the rate of 0.02%
per hour, then working back to a point in time of 10:15 p.m ..
then an individual's

<appellant's) blood alcohol would be

about 0.23% at 10:15 p.m.

IT. 263-264).

In

the· other

situation (absorption), Dr. Finkle testified that again,
assuming that all drinking by appellant ceased at 10:25
p.m., the alcohol maximum concentration point would be
reached at 11:15 p.m.
level .19%.

(.21%), making the 12:15 a.m. alcohol

Then, at approximately 10:45 p.m.,

(the time

of the accident), appellant's alcohol blood level would have
been somewhere between .OS and .08 (T. 264-266).

Dr. Finkle,

however, further related that such a possibility of one's
alcohol content going from zero (at 10:15 p.m.), to .21% in
one hour is extremely unlikely (T. 266).

He also testified

that a person weighing the same as appellant (135 lb.), would
have to have about 3.5 fluid ounces of pure alcohol (7 fluid
ounces of 100 proof alcohol) circulatinq in their body to
obtain a .19% alcohol blood readinq (T. 268).

Furthermore,

since most whiskey is SO-proof, appellant would have

had
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to consume about 9 fluid ounces of whiskey to have reached
a .19% alcohol reading (T. 268) .

Dr. Finkle said that even

these figures constituted a minimum or conservative estimate
'

since 9 fluid ounces of whiskey consumed over a long period
of time would be absorbed by the body and eliminated at
such a rate that no or very little alcohol concentration cou;:
be built up (T. 169).

Such an amount of alcohol (9 fluid

ounces l . would have to be consumed over an hour to an hour
and a half. with the last drink coming an hour prior to a
.19% reading, in order for there to be a blood alcohol

concententration of 0.19%, according to Dr. Finkle (T. 269).

1

The passenqer in appellant's car, Eppie Duran,
testified that appellant had a glass of something to drink
about 10:25 p.m., immediately prior to their leaving a
friend's house (T. 177).

Appellant drank it "real fast" as

they were leaving (T. 177) .

Duran said that he (himself)'

was drinking whiskey and coke (T. 176) , but could not say
what appellant was drinking (T. 176).

Duran stated that he

felt a little intoxicated when he left their friend's house
and headed up State Street (north)

1

(T. 179) •

Testimony by

Testimony by Officer Smith, Rigby, Peay, and Wil~inson
revealed that appellant did not have any a~coholic . P·~'·
beverage to drink from the time of the accident (lO • 45134 1.
until the time the blood samples were taken (T. 128,
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ouran also revealed that he told appellant to slow down as
they were approaching the intersection at State Street and
3900 South (T. 180).
Testimony by Trooper Taylor of the Utah Highway
Patrol revealed that skid marks were left by appellant's
vehicle immediately prior to the collision (T. 149, 152).
Gouge marks were also present (T. 154) .
Finally,

testimony by Trooper Steen of the Utah

Highway Patrol revealed that the cycle of operation of the
traffic lights at the intersection of 3900 South and State
Street on the night of July 21, 1977, was such that the through
traffic lanes

(north and southbound) were red when the left

turn green arrow was on.

The traffic lights controlling

north and southbound traffic would remain red until all
left turning traffic would have cleared (T. 166-167).

He

also stated that the "gutter portion" of the road on which
appellant was traveling was used about 80% of the time as a
right turn lane (T. 167).
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED
THE JURY THAT AN ELEMENT OF AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE IS NEGLIGENCE AND
THAT TO SUSTAIN A CHARGE OF AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE, THE JURY MUST FIND,
AMONG OTHER ELEHENTS, THAT APPELLANT
DROVE OR OPERATED HIS MOTOR VEHICLE
IN A NEGLIGENT MANNER.
Appellant contends that the trial court erroneously
instructed the jury inthe elements of automobile homicide
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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because the court instructed the jury that simple negligence
was the type of negligence that the State must prove.

~

further contends that the proper standard of negligence

~

which the jury should have been instructed and to which the
State must be held in their burden of proof is criminal
negligence.
Appellant concedes that his contention and argumen:
has been rejected by the Utah Supreme Court in previous cases,
State v. Durant, 561 P.2d 1056,

(Utah, 1977), State v. Wade,

572 P.2d 398 (Utah, 1977), State v. Anderson, 561 P.2d 1061
(Utah, 1977), and State v. Risk, 520 P. 2d 215 (Utah, 1974).
He nevertheless argues that these cases should be overruled
and the dissenting opinion of Justice Maughan in State v.
Durant, supra,

be adooted as law in this state.

Snch an arou:

by appellant is apparently based upon two statutory provisions
§

76-2-101, Utah Code Ann.,

Utah Code Ann.,

(1953, as amended), and § 76-5-ln

( 1953, as amended), which appellant claims

are in conflict with the automobile homicide statute,
§

76-5-207, Utah Code Ann.,

(1953, as amended).

Respondent submits that the law in this state
is well settled, i.e. , in an automobile homicide prosecution,
the State need prove only simple negligence and not criminal
.
neg 1 igence.

S ta t e v. Duran t , supra, atl058·,Statev.W~•

-10-
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supra, at 400; State v. Anderson, supra, at 1063; State v.
~·

supra at 213.
Appellant has advanced no reason why this Court

should reverse itself and change the present state of the
law.

Respondent submits there is no need for change, since

the statutes cited by appellant are not in conflict.
Utah Code Ann.,

§

76-5-201 (1953, as amended), speaks of the

elements and ways in which one may commit criminal homicide:
(1) A person commits criminal homicide
if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly,
or with criminal negligence unlawfully
causes the death of another.
(2) Criminal homicide is murder in
the first and second degree, manslaughter,
or negligent homicide, or automobile
homicide.
(Emphasis added) .
Utah Code Ann., § 76-2-101 (1953, as amended), reads:
No person is guilty of an offense
unless his conduct is prohibited by
law and:
(1) He acts intentionally, knowingly,
recklessly or with criminal negligence
with respect"""to each element of the
offense as the definition of the offense
requires; or
(2) His acts constitute an offense
involving strict liability.
(Emphasis added) .
Utah Code Ann.,

§

76-5-207

(1953, as amended), defines

automobile homicide:
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes
automobile homicide if the actor, while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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a controlled substance, or any drug, to
a degree which renders the actor incapable of
safely driving a vehicle, causes the death
of another by operating a motor vehicle
in a negligent manner.
A careful reading of these statutes cited discloses
no conflict.

Secttons 76-2-101 and 76-5-201 are both

written in the disjunctive.
§

A person, under the terms of

76-5-201 may commit criminal homicide if he "intentionally,

knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence unlawfully
causes the death of another."

The statute does not require

that the death be caused in all of the ways mentioned, only
by one.

The same principle holds true for § 76-2-101, where

it specifies that one must act "intentionally, knowingly,
recklessly, or with criminal negligence with respect to
each element of the offense as the definition of the offense
requires."
Applying §§ 76-5-201 and 76-2-101 to the automobile
homicide section 76-5-207, it becomes evident

that the

elements of the offense of automobile homicide can be satisfied
by one acting intentionally, or knowingly, or recklessly, or
in a criminally negligent manner.

As a specific example, one

may be intentionally negligent, knowingly negligent, reckless)
negligent, or negligent in a criminally negligent manner.
Any manner is sufficient, as long as the evidence
to meet the burden of proof.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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.
l

s sufficien:

.:

Furthermore, under the provisions of § 76-5-201,
a person may commit criminal homicide (automobile homicide
under 76-5-201(2)), in any

one of four ways:

intentionally,

knowingly, recklessly, or in a criminally negligent manner.
As was stated in State v. Wade, 572 P.2d at 399, an act, in
order to be labeled as one of criminal homicide under
§

76-5-201, be it automobile homicide or otherwise, need

not necessarily be cornmi tted in a criminally negligent manner.
Thus, appellant's allegation that

cri~inal

negligence

an element of automobile homicide does not stand.

i~

Had the

legislature intended for criminal ngeligence to be the
standard of negligence to which the prosecutor was bound in
an automobile homicide prosecution most certainly they would
have specified so in§ 76-5-207.
used the term,

11

•

a negligent manner .

Instead, the legislature

causes the death of another . .

•

.

.

• in

11

The trial judge instructed the jury on the elements
of automobile homicide specifically as they appear in the
Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-207

76).

(1953, as amended).

(R. 75,

These instructions were in harmony with the law as

set forth by this Court in the Durant, Wade, Anderson and
~ cases.

Appellant has advanced no valid reason for

this Court to reverse itself.

The lower court's instructions

regarding the elements of automobile homicide and the degree
of negligence required must therefore be upheld.
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POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED
THE JURY ON THE PRESUMPTIONS CREATED
BY A BLOOD ALCOHOL LEVEL ABOVE 0.08
SINCE THERE WAS EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
THE GIVING OF SUCH AN INSTRUCTION.
Appellant alleges that it was reversible error
for the trial court to instruct the jury on the presumptions
created by a blood alcohol level above 0.08.

He attempts

to support such an alleaation on the theory that no evidence
existed to support such an instruction.

Respondent submits

that the record discloses evidence to support the giving
of the instruction by the trial court regarding presumptions
of being under the influence of intoxicating liquor (R. 78). 2
Respondent agrees with appellant that in order to
convict one of automobile homicide, the State must prove
that a person was under the influence of intoxicating
liquor to a degree which renders the person incapable of
. .
sa f e 1 y d riving
a ve h'ic 1 e.

3

From that, the State must

also prove that at the time of the driving which resulted
in the death of Eric Skollingsberg, the appellant, Johnnie
Chavez, was under the influence of alcohol.

The trial

court so instructed (R. 76).

2

The instruction given by the trial court was taken f~m
Utah Code Ann., § 41-6-44 (b) (1953, as amended}•

3

Utah Code Ann., § 76-5-207 (1953, as amended).
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A review of the evidence discloses that the
state's expert witness, Dr. Bryan Finkle,

4

was called to

"relate back " or "extrapolate" the blood alcohol level of
appellant at the time the blood
the accident.

~as

taken to

t~e

time of

In doing this, Dr. Finkle used several

figures and gave two figures as to what appellant's blood
alcohol level was at the time of the accident.

He stated

that in general, a person consuming alcohol will reach their
maximum alcohol concentration level approximately one hour
following their last drink (T. 251).

In other words, after

all drinking has ceased, alcohol is absorbed into a person's
system during the next hour until a maximum alcohol concentration level in the blood is reached.

Following this,

the alcohol begins to "clear" from the blood at approximately
0.02% per hour (T. 252).

The evidence disclosed that appellant's blood
samples were taken at 12:14 a.m. and 12:45 a.m. on July
22, 1977, these times being some hour and a half and two

hours after the accident at 10:45 p.m. on July 21, 1977
(T. 190-101).

These samples were analyzed and found to

contain .19 percent alcohol by weight (T. 214).

There was

no specific time as to when appellant had his last drink.
However, several pieces of evidence gave clues from which a

Dr. Finkle, a toxicologist, pharamcologist, and pathologist
at the University of Utah, qualified as an expert witness in
Judge Baldwin's court at pages 247-258 of the trial transcript.
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jury could infer time periods in which appellant would have
had to have consumed his last drink.

First appellant's frie:.:

Eppie Duran, had been with appellant during the evening of
July 21, and testified that appellant had nothing to drink
after 10: 30 p.m. on July 21, fifteen minutes prior to the
accident (T. 177).

Duran stated that he saw appellant with

a glass in his hand at 10:25 p.m., while they were at a
friend's house (T. 177).

Immediately prior to leaving

their friend's house, appellant drank the liquid in the glass
"real fast"

(T. 177).

Duran stated that he (himself) was

drinking whiskey and coke, but he could not say for sure
what appellant was drinking (T. 176).

Respondent feels that

at this point, based upon Duran's testimony, a jury could
infer and/or deduce that if in fact whiskey or some type of
alcohol was in appellant's glass just prior to leaving
his friend's house, this drink would have been his last.
Furthermore, Dr. Finkle's calculations, therefore, could be
based upon 10:25 p.m. as a reference point for determining
what the blood alcohol level was at 10:45 p.m., the time cl
the accident.
In determining the amount of alcohol appellant had
consumed, Dr. Finkle testified that a person weighing the
same as appellant (135 lbs.) , would have to have about 3.S
fluid ounces of pure alcohol (7 fluid ounces of 100 proof
alcohol) circulating in their body in order to obtain a
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blood alcohol reading of .19% (T. 268).

Since most whiskey

is so-proof, appellant would have had to consume about nine
fluid

ounces of whiskey to have reached a .19% reading

(T. 26).

A jury could, therefore, based upon Dr. Finkle's

testimony, find that at 12:14 a.m. on July 22, 1977, appellant
had at least 3.5 fluid ounces of pure alcohol (7 fluid
ounces of 100 proof alcohol or 9 fluid ounces of 80 proof
alcohol) circulating in his blood stream.
In relating back these figures to determine what
the alcohol blood level would have been at 10:45 p.m.,
Dr. Finkle stated that such a figure would depend upon when
the last drink was taken.

Without knowing when the maximum

alcohol concentration point occurred, and using the figure that
alcohol clears the system at a rate of approximate .02% per
hour, appellant's blood alcohol level at 10:45 p.m., would
have been about .22%, which is well above the .08% of which
appellant is complaining that there is no evidence

(T.

262-

264).

Dr. Finkle also stated that assuming alcohol was
being absorbed, and the last drink was taken at 10:30 p.m.,
then maximum alcohol concentration level would be reached at
approximately 11:30 p.m., and a chart which graphs alcohol
absorption and alcohol blood content would intersect at 10:45
p.m. somewhere between .05 and .08% (T. 277).

Dr. Finkle
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however, noted that the possibility of someone who

st<!.E~

drinking at approximately 10:30 p.rn. and having a maximum
blood alcohol concentration going from essentially zero

(n~

having any drinking pattern), to 0.21% in one hour was
extremely unlikely (T. 266) .

He then went on to elaborate

on the amount of alcohol that appellant would have had to ha1e
consumed in order to show a reading of .19% at 12: 14 a.m.
(T.

266-269).

He further stated that if such an amount of

alcohol had been consumed over a long period of time, the
body would have absorbed it and eliminated it at such a
rate the person would never have built up any alcohol concentration at all (T. 269).

A jury could therefore deduce

or find that the amount of alcohol found to be present in
appellant's blood at 12:14 a.m.

(a fact), would have had to

have been consumed over a rather short period of time.
Since the alcohol level was at least at a . 21% level at 11:14
p.m. on July 21, 1977, a jury could find that the alcohol
blood level would have been at least .09% at 10:45 p.m.,
and probably much higher.

As Dr. Finkle stated, the

possibility of a person's alcohol blood level going from
.08% at 10:45 p.m.

(0% at 10:30 p.m., assuming>appellant's

one and only 9 ounce drink was consumed at 10:25 p.m.), to
·
. 21% at 11 : 14 p.m. is
ex t reme 1 y remo t e.

Thi' s would represent

a jump of .13% alcohol blood level in 30 minutes.
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Based

upon this, a jury could find that appellant had consumed more
than one 9 fluid ounce drink at 10:25, and had in fact been
drinking throughout the evening.

Furthermore, a jury could

also find that appellant's blood level was well above .. 08%
at the time of the accident, based upon Dr. Finkle's testimony,
which in turn was based upon reasonable medical certainty.
Respondent thus submits that there was certainly
ample evidence upon which to give point 3 of Instruction No.
17 (R. 78).

Respondent also submits that case law supports

respondent's position that the instruction was properly
given.
State v. Bradley, 578 P.2d 1267 (Utah, 1978),
which appellant cites, does not support his allegations,
but instead supports respondent's argument and explains the
law as it exists in Utah.

In Bradley, defendant was convicted

of driving under the influence, showed an alcohol blood
level of .06% four hours after he ran a red light, and
caused an accident.

He alleged that the trial court should

not have instructed the jury with regard to statutory
presumptions based on blood alcohol levels present at
the time of the incident because the state was allegedly
unable to adequately extrapolate the chemical test results
to that time.

In agreeing with the defendant, the Court said:

Thus, in cases arising before
the enactment of 41-6-44.5, if the
state is unable to produce chemical
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test results sufficient, to allow a
presumption of intoxication when
the test was administered, it must
necessarily provide expert testimony
to extrapolate the lower readings back
to the time of the incident to show that
a defendant's blood alcohol level was
then sufficient to give rise to the
presumption.
578 P.2d at 1269 (emphasis added).
It is certainly evident that the state in the case at bar
has met all the requirements of Bradley.

First, the state

introduced chemical test results showing a .19% reading at
the time the test was administered.

This is well above the

. 08% re9uisite before a presumption of intoxication arises.
Second, the state, through the use of expert testimony, ·
extrapolated the results back to show a possible . 22% readinc
at the time of the accident.

5

Even using the situation,

arguendo, where one drink was taken at 10:30 p.m., a readin9
going from zero to . 21% in 45 minutes is extremely unlikely.
Thus, a reading above .08% at 10:45 p.m., is at worst a very
definite "reasonable medical certainty."

5

It is questionable whether or not according to the langua::
in Bradley, the State is required to extrapolate the r~si ...
back if the results at the time of testing show that te
presumption cutoff (.08%)is met.
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Finally, attention is called to three cases which
support respondent's argument.

In State v. Koklasch, Or. App.,

502 P.2d 1158 (1972), defendant alleged that his case should
not have been submitted to the jury because there was insufficient evidence to show what his blood alcohol context was
at the time he was driving the automobile.

The statute under

which he was convicted prohibited driving a motor vehicle when
the alcohol content was more than .15%.
showed .23% 33 minutes after his arrest.

Defendant's test
The court held

that the test results raised a rebuttable presumption that
the blood alcohol content

was not less than shown thereby

when the defendant was driving.
In State v. Turner, 94 Idaho 548, 494 P.2d 146
(1972), the defendant objected to the giving of an instruction
raising a presumption of intoxication.

He was involved in

an accident and took the breath test some two hours and 45
minutes later.

The results showed .10%.

The presumption of

intoxication was "more than .10% by weight alcohol."

In

upholding the giving of the instruction, the Idaho Supreme
Court said:
The test revealed a blood alcohol
content of 0.10%.
Since the alcohol
content decreases at the rate of 0.01%
to 0.02% per hour after tte first fortyfive to sixty minutes, the state's
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chemical analyst testified that
0.10% was less than the "peak"
alcohol content reached earlier
that night.
494 P.2d at 148.
Subsequent to Turner, the Idaho Supreme Court
in State v. Sutliff, 97 Idaho 523, 547 P.2d 1128 (1976),
held that:
. . . this statute [creating
presumptions in a prosecution for
Driving under the Influence]
does
not require extrapolation back but
establishes that the percentage of
blood alcohol as shown by chemical
analysis relates back to the time of
the alleged offense for purposes of
applying the statutory presumption.
547 P.2d at 1130 (emphasis added).
Respondent thus submits that the evidence was
sufficient to warrant the giving of point 3 of Instruction
No. 17, instructing

the jury on the presumptions of

intoxication.
POINT III.
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO
SHOW THAT APPELLANT, AT THE TIME
OF THE ACCIDENT, WAS UNDER THE
INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL SUFFICIENTLY TO
A DEGREE TO RENDER HIM INCAPABLE OF
SAFELY DRIVING A VEHICLE.
Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficie:·
to convict him of automobile homicide and for that reason,
.

a'

the court below erred in not granting his motion to dismiss ·
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the conclusion of the State's case (T. 287).
in his brief states that " . .

Appellant,

there was simply no evidence

of his intoxication at the time of driving.

" Appellant's

Brief, p. 11.
Respondent strongly challenges such a statement
by appellant.

The evidence speaks for itself regarding the

issue of intoxication at the time of driving:
1.

Appellant drove his car through a red traffic

light (T. 48-49, 56-59, 60-63, 73, 83-84, 91-92, 98, 109, 117).
2.

Appellant drove through the intersection in

a lane not designated for through traffic.

The "lane" was

used only for right turns and for buses stopping for passengers
(T. 66, 95, 167).

3.

The car which appellant "struck" was lawfully

making a left turn through the intersection (T. 38-49).
4.

Appellant was driving the car at a fast rate

of speed (T. 57, 71, 63)

(60 miles per hour and 65 miles· per

hour, T. 71 , 8 3 ) .
5.

Appellant came so close to hitting two young

boys sitting at a bus stop bench that they had to pull up
their feet to keep from getting hit (T. 109, 117).
6.

When appellant exited his car following the

accident, he "wandered around," acting as if he were in a
daze (T. 98-99).
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7.

Officers who arrived at the scene shortly afte:

the accident stated that they detected the odor
about appellant's person (T. 123, 128).

of alcohol

The nurse who

withdrew samples of appellant's blood, Evelyn Mayberry, stat,
that she detected the odor of alcohol on appellant"s
(T. 191).

~

9u

She also stated that his pupils were dilated

(T. 191).

8.

Appellant's blood alcohol level one and one·ha'

hours after the accident was .19% (T. 214).

Using a "burn<

rate of • 02% per hour, this would give appellant a blood
alcohol level of . 22% at the time of the accident (T. 263·
264).

9.

Evidence produced through Dr. Finkle establishe;

that appellant would have had to consumed a minimum of 9
fluid ounces during the previous hours to obtain a blood
alcohol level of .19% (T. 269).
10.

Assuming that appellant drank his 9 fluid

ounces of alcohol at 10:30 p.m. or thereabouts, Dr. Finkle's
testimony would seem to infer that for appellant to go from
0% alcohol blood level to . 21% 45 minutes later is bordering

on the incredible.

A jury could infer that appellant h~

been drinking alcohol over the course of the evening.
Testimony, uncontradicted, evidences that appellant had
nothing alcoholic to drink after 10:30 p.m.

Thus, most of

the nine ounces of alcohol came during a period prior to

-24-
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l0:30 p.m.

Thus, with appellant's blood alcohol level

being .21% at 11:15 p.m., most certainly his blood alcohol
level would have been above .08 only 30 minutes earlier.
These facts constitute sufficient evidence on
which reasonable minds could have based a decision to find
that appellant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor
at the time of the accident to such a degree that he .was
rendered incapable of safely driving a vehicle.
offered no evidence to show otherwise.

Appellant

Respondent further

submits that notwithstanding the presumption of being under
the influence, the evidence is sufficient to convict
appellant of automobile homicide.
Appellant has not challenged any other elements
of the crime other than being under the influence to the
degree required.

Respondent thus submits that the evidence

is sufficient to sustain the conviction, and the ruling of
the trial court overruling appellant's motion to dismiss
because of insufficiency of evidence should be affirmed.

A.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED
INTO EVIDENCE EXHIBITS 11 AND 12,
THE RESULTS OF APPELLANT'S BLOOD
TESTS.
Appellant contends that § 41-6-44.5 Utah Code
Ann.,

(1953, as amended), was not complied with, and as a

result, the blood test

results showing the alcohol blood
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level content of appellant should not have been admitted

• He

a:c-gues that the blood tests were taken more than hour after
the accident and that the State did not prove the probative
value of such tests.
Respondent submits that appellant is wrong in
his argument on two counts.
is arguing is § 41-6-44. 5.

First, the section which appelk:
The Automobile Homicide Statute,

§ 76-5-207, refers to § 41-6-44 (b), of the Utah Motor Vehicle
Act:
(2) The presumption established by
section 4-6-44(b) of the Utah Motor
Vehicle Act, relating to blood alcohol
percentage shall be applicable to this
section and any chemical test administered
on a defendant . . . after his arrest.
shall be admissible in accordance with
the rules of evidence.
Respondent merely points out the fact that the

'I

legisla~u

did specifically mention § 41-6-44 (b) of the Motor Vehicle
Act, to the exclusion of other statutes.

Furthermore,

§ 76-5-207(2) specifies that" . . . any chemical test
administered . .

. shall be admissible in accordance with the

rules of evidence."

Respondent again points out the fact

that the legislature specifically stated that the chemical.
tests be admissible according to the rules of evidence, not
according to § 41-6-44.5.
Respondent notes that § 41-6-44. 5, through the use
of its language, may bring§ 76-5-207(2) within the previewof
its terms:
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In any action or proceeding in
which it is material to prove that
a person was driving under the influence
of alcohol . . .
Notwithstanding the fact that § 76-5-207 may or
may not come within th€ perview of § 41-6-44.5, respondent
submits that the State has complied with the terms of § 41-6-44.5.
Since the test was administered more than an hour following
the accident, one requirement must be met in order for the
blood test

results

to be admissible. that requirement

being that the probative value of the tests be established
through the use of expert testimony.
The probative value was established via the testimony
of Dr. Bryan Finkle.

He showed through the use of "extra-

polation" what appellant's blood alcohol level would have
been at the time of the accident using facts, figures, and
data based upon reasonable medical certainty.

His qualifications

as an expert in the field of forensic toxicology were accepted
by the trial court after examination and voir dire (T. 259).
His testimony was allowed by the court, and pursuant to Utah
Rules of Evidence, Rule 56(2) (3), his testimony as an
expert witness was properly admitted.

Certainly there can

be no question as to the probative value of his testimony as
to the blood level of appellant at the time of the accident.
Appellant, in challenging the results of the test, is
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admittedly dissatisfied with the apparent decision of the
jury to believe the expert testimony of Dr. Finkle.

No

reason has been shown as to why his testimony is not
probative or as why the results of the blood tests should
not have been accepted into evidence.

Most of appellant's

argument in Point III A. is devoted to why § 41-6-44.5 is
applicable to § 76-5-207, instead of telling this Court what,
if any reason, exists as to why the results of the tests
should not be admitted and in what way the State did not
tie in the probative value of Dr. Finkle's testimony.
Finally, appellant cites the Bradley case {see
Point I, infra) , apparently in support of his contentions.
Respondent notes that appellant alleges in his brief that
"No expert testimony was given there"
Bradley case).

(referring to the

Respondent calls the Court's attention to

the Bradley case at 578 P. 2d 1268 and 1269, where the Court
several times refers to "the state's expert."

The Bradle1

case has seemingly been misinterpreted by appellant.

There

the court did not say that the test results were inadmissible
because of a lack of probative value.

The Court merely said

that if the State is unable to produce chemical test

resultS

sufficient to allow a presumption of intoxication when the
test was administered (. 08 or less), then expert testimony
must be provided to extropolate the lower readings back to the
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time of the incident to show that a defendant's blood
alcohol level was then sufficient to give rise to the
presumption.
Respondent submits that the State:

(1) provided

expert testimony in the form of Dr. Finkle, which was
accepted by the trial court;

(2) such testimony was of

probative value because the test results, which gave rise to
a presumption at the time they

were taken, were extrapolated

back to the time of the accident to give rise to a presumption
at that critical time.

The test results were therefore

properly admitted into evidence, and§ 41-6-44.5 was complied
with.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
THE RESULTS OF THE BLOOD ALCOHOL
ANALYSIS OR TO ALTERNATIVELY
DISMISS THE ACTION.
Appellant moved, prior to trial, to suppress the
blood alcohol results of the blood samples taken from him

(R. 23).

A hearing was held before the same judge that

tried the case (T. 478-504).

Evidence was taken, a memorandum

submitted, and appellant's motion denied.

Appellant claims

such a ruling was reversible error.
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The evidence at the hearing revealed that foll .

OW1n;

appellant's accident during the late hours of July 21, 197),
two samples of blood were removed from his arm at approximat,

12:14 a.m. and 12:48 a.m. on July 22, 1977.

The samples were

removed by Evelyn Mayberry, a Registered Nurse.

The followi;:

day those samples were turned over to Lvnn Davis, a chemist
with the Salt Lake County Health Department.

Testimony by

Mr. Davis reveals that those samples were kept in a refrigera:·
in his laboratory until they were tested on August 1, 1977,
He stated that he kept the samples in his refrigerator until
testing in order to guard the chain of evidence and in order
to prolong the life of a preservative which was in the tube,
along with the blood and alcohol ( R. 4 9 5) .

Mr. Davis also

stated that upon his analysis completion of the samples,
they were put in a box and sent to the State Health Departrne:
for analysis (R. 495) .

The samples were kept at room

temperature in the interim period between analysis and beinc
sent to the State Health Department (R. 495).

The trial

court asked Mr. Davis about any experiments he may have
performed testing blood alcohol samples which had been
kept in a refrigerator over an extended period of timeu
opposed to samples which had been left out at room temperatu:
Mr. Davis replied that he had performed only one such experiment.

He further stated that there

were several fac t'''··
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which affect the decrease of blood alcohol content of a
sample, temperature being one (R. 496).

Mr. Davis said

also that it was his usual procedure not to refrigerate
samples after completion of testing (R. 499).
whether

When asked

he would have any knowledge as to whether or

not there would be any deterioration or increase of blood
alcohol levels over a period of time if a sample were
refrigerated for five months, he responded he did not know
since he had not done any work in that area (R. 499) .
Appellant's argument alleges that the act (by Lynn
Davis) of leaving his blood specimens at room temperature
is tantamount to destroying those samples.
Respondent submits that appellant's allegations are
totally unfounded for several reasons.

First, it is

questionable as to whether or not Lynn Davis, a chemist
with the County Health Department, is, in fact, an agent of
the prosecution's office.
not (R. 502).

The trial court found that he was

It is not necessary to the disposition of this

issue to decide whether or not in this case he was in fact
an agent of the prosecution.

Respondent will assume,

arguendo, that he was.
Second, it is very important to note that the
record does not disclose that appellant ever requested the
trial court or the prosecution to turn over to him one of the
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samples so that a separate analysis could be run by another
chemist at defense counsel's request.

The record reflects

that appellant was referred to the Legal Defender's Office
August 12, 19 77.

Counsel appeared with him in court on

August 15, 1977.

The record just reflects the appearance

or,

of appellant's present counsel on September 8, 1977 (R. 3).
An information was filed on November 3, 1977 (R. 9).

Finally,

on January 5, 19 7 8, appellant through his present counsel fik
his motion to suppress

(R. 23).

A time period of almost

four months elapsed between defense counsel's first record
of appearance and his filing of the motion.

The record does

not reflect that a request was ever made to

the court

or the prosecution that a blood sample be turned over to the
defense for separate analysis.

Respondent will concede that

if appellant had made a request for such a sample, and it
thereby was denied, or if there was a long delay in turning
.. over the sample after it was requested, perhaps appellant's
claim would

be

stronger, particularly if he could show that

such a delay caused the sample content to be altered in such
· ld accura t e resu lt s.
a way as no t t o yie

Such, however, is

not the case.
Appellant has not shown what he alleges.

He has

presented no evidence that the blood samples (alcohol content:

-32-
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would have produced any other results than those offered at
trial.

He has not shown in what way, if any, the blood

samples were suppressed or destroyed.

They have not been

destroyed -- they were offered at trial as evidence.

They

have not been suppressed from the defense--no request has been
made for them to be made available.

All that has been done

is that a blatant allegation by appellant has been made with
no evidence whatsoever to substantiate it.
Finally, appellant has not shown that they (samples),

(if this Court finds they have been destroyed) , were material
to appellant's guilt or innocence.
P.2d 477 (Utah, 1975).

State v. Stewart, 544

The rule of law in Utah, as set

forth by this Court in the Stewart case is:
. a deliberate suppression
or destruction of evidence by those
charged with the prosecution; including
police officers, constitutes a denial
of due process if the evidence is
material to the guilt or innocence
of the defendant.
544 P.2d at 479

(emphasis added).

Appellant has not shown that his analysis of the
blood samples would be material to his guilt or innocence.
Two samples were withdrawn from appellant.

Both samples

revealed the same blood alcohol content (.1990).

Even if

appellant had run a test on a sample, it is difficult to
imagine that such a test would do anything other than corroborate
the prosecution's case.
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Both samples were available or would have been made
available to appellant if he had requested them (at 1east one
sample would have been available).
The fundamental fairness guaranteed appellant under
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the State
and Federal Constitutions has not been violated or abridged.
As such, the trial court's ruling should be sustained.
POINT V.
THE RECORD INDICATES THAT
APPELLANT WAS PROPERLY SENTENCED
TO THE UTAH STATE PRISON.
Appellant contends that he was sentenced in
his absence, and that he must now be resentenced.

The

record discloses that on April 14, 1978, appellant was
sentenced to be imprisoned in the Utah State Prison for a
term of zero to five years.

Appellant was present, and a stay

of execution was granted to July 14, in order that appellant
could undergo a 90-day evaluation (R. 140, 138-139).
90-day evaluation was ordered on July 14 (R. 155).

A further!

Appellant

absconded from Odyssey House on August 12, and a bench
warrant was issued on August 15, 1978 (R. 158).
entry shows that on October 27, 1978,

The minute

appellant's counsel

appeared without appellant and the trial court did not exten
'1 14
the stay of execution of the sentence pronounced on Apri

-34-
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(R. 165, 166).

The bench warrant was still outstanding, and

the minute entry reads as follows:
The above named defendant having
been granted a stay of execution of
sentence to this date. Now on the courts
own motion and good cause appearing
thereof, it is ordered that a commitment
issue forthwith as heretofore sentenced.
R. 165.
The Judgment and Commitment read exactly the same.

(R. 166).

Respondent submits that appellant was properly
sentenced the first time on April 14, 1978, when he was
present.

The proceedings on October 27, 1978, were for the

purpose of discontinuing the stay of execution.

Thus,

appellant has shown no need to be re-sentenced.
CONCLUSION
Respondent has shown that the alleged errors complained
of by appellant were not in fact errors at all.

The trial

court properly instructed the jury that simple negligence,
not criminal negligence, is the proper degree of negligence
to be proved in an automobile homicide prosecution.

Second,

there was ample evidence to support the giving of the instruction of the presumptions created by a blood alcohol
level of 0.08%.

Third, the evidence was sufficient on

which reasonable minds could conclude that appellant, at
the time of the accident, was under the influence of alcohol
sufficiently to a degree to render him incapable of safely
driving a vehicle.

Fourth, the blood test results were
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properly received into evidence and were
time of the accident via expert testimony.

tied in to

~e

Fifth, appellant's

claim that the blood alcohol samples were "destroyed" is
totally without merit for the reasons cited by respondent.
Finally, appellant was properly sentenced, and he must serve
the sentence imposed upon him if appellant's appeal is dismis
For these reasons, respondent urges that the
judgment of conviction of the lower court be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for Respondent
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